HJUD-260513-1300

This meeting of the House Judiciary Committee will now come to order. The time is now 1:47 PM on Wednesday, May 13th, 2026. We are meeting in the Grunberg Room, Capitol Room 120. The following members are present: Representative Eichide, Representative Vance, Representative Costello, and myself, Representative Gray, Chair. Let the record reflect that we have a quorum to conduct business.

I would like to recognize the staff supporting this meeting. Sophia Tenney from House Records, Kyla Tupou from the Juneau LIO, and Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, my committee aide. We have 3 items of business on today's agenda, starting with HB 325, Industrial Hemp, by Representative McCabe, followed by consideration of Governor's appointee Mike Miller to the Alaska Judicial Council, and finally House Bill 222, Workplace Violence Protective Orders, from Representative Hall.

We will now take up House Bill 325, Industrial Hemp, sponsored by Representative McCabe. At this time, I would like to invite Representative McCabe and his Staff Alicia Almeida to the witness table. Mr. Representative McCabe, please place yourself on the record and begin your presentation. Thank you, Chair Gray and the members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to hear or to present this bill again.

For the record, my name is Representative Kevin McCabe. I represent House District 30. Today we're talking about HB 323 relating to industrial hemp. Industrial hemp is nontoxicating industrial agricultural crop used for fiber, grain, animal bedding, CBD, and other products. It is not marijuana.

That's important.

Important. Federal law defines legal hemp as containing no more than 0.3% delta-9 THC. HB 329 does not change this limit. That's also important. Instead, it updates our statutes to ensure our regulatory framework is clear, predictable, and aligned with federal law while protecting small agricultural producers from an unnecessary red tape.

The bill maintains a 0.3% THC standard and preserves a 1% destruction threshold that requires federally compliant testing methods. Under current law, crops testing between 0.3 and 1% THC have limited and unclear remediation options. HB 325 makes this much clearer by explicitly allowing growers to retain, recondition, remediate, or repurpose the crop. Instead of facing automatic destruction, which was what caused a bunch of our farmers to stop growing it, frankly. The bill establishes corrective action procedures that require written notice and opportunity to cure deficiencies and objective criteria before any civil penalties, suspension, or revocation.

This bill does 5 main things. It creates tiered grower categories, including micro grower category. For small operations with scaled fees reporting inspection and testing, it eliminates duplicative in-state transport permits when proper documentation is provided. It accepts federally, federally approved seed sources without requiring duplicative state grow-out trials and removes the previous felony conviction disqualification for registration. Finally, Hemp Bill explicitly allows manufacturing and retail sale of industrial hemp and hemp products.

Importantly, HB 325 again does not expand THC limits. It does not weaken enforcement authority, and it does not reduce oversight for high THC violations. It strengthens clarity and ensures hemp is regulated as agriculture, not as a controlled substance.

HB 325 promotes fairness, consistency, and responsible oversight while protecting Alaska farmers and reducing unnecessary state bureaucracy. So at this time, Chair Gray, I get— I think we're under a little bit of a time crunch for you, so you can, uh, your choice if you want my staff, um, El Shiva Almeida, to walk through the sectional, or if you would just like to take questions. I think if we have no questions, let's go— let's do the sectional. Yeah. Oh, for the record, we are joined by Representative Mina at 1:49 PM.

Great. Good afternoon, Chair Gray, members of the committee. For the record, my name is Ellie Chevalmeida, staff to Representative Kevin McCabe. So the sectional analysis was lengthy, so I condensed it into a concise explanation. Section 1 expands the Commissioner of Natural Resources' authority to adopt regulations governing the industrial hemp program.

This includes approved seed sources without state and grown trials. Again, that they're federally approved. Post-harvest THC testing, isolation distances, manufacturing and retail sale authorization, tiered growing categories, a 30-day harvest window, elimination of duplicative in-state transportation— transport permits, and corrective action plans to prioritize compliance. Sections 2 and 3 update testing to require federally compliant methods that account for measurement uncertainty. It clarifies the THC thresholds.

Authorizes corrective action plans with notice and opportunity to cure before penalties. Sections 4 through 8 declare industrial hemp an agricultural crop, remove the prior felony conviction disqualification, and modernizes registration. It expands allowable activities, updates recordkeeping and inspection rules, sets cost recovery fees with reductions for microgrowers, authorizes risk-based inspections, and allows stop sale orders for unregistered productions. Section 9 confirms that crops testing between 0.3% and 0.9% THC may be retained and remediated. Failure to do so would still be considered a violation.

Section 10 defines microgrower as less than a fourth of an acre or fewer than 200 plants, including indoor and greenhouse operations. Sections 11 through 13 exempts compliant hemp and hemp products, so those that are less than 0.3% THC, from the marijuana excess tax and provides a transition for certain previously lapsed registrants and sets an effective date of July 1st, 2026. That concludes the sectional analysis. I will now hand it back to the committee chair. Thanks, Ms. Almeida.

Any questions for sponsor before we go to public testimony?

Seeing none, we will— at ease because it's all Back on the record, we'll actually go to invited testimony first. We will go to Sarah Williams, president of the Sacred Seeds Foundation in Wasilla. Ms. Williams, if you will take yourself off mute, place yourself on the record, and begin your testimony.

All right, thank you so much. So my name is Sarah Williams. I live in Wasilla. Um, I am a state employee for DPA. My opinions are my own.

I am also Thank you, President Bowe, Sacred Seeds Foundation, and chair and members of the committee. Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify today. So Sacred Seeds is a Matsu-based, faith-rooted nonprofit working to build a real industrial hemp economy in Alaska. From acres in the ground, we say, to finished products in your homes. Our flagship project is Green Build Composites in Houston, where we are developing as Alaska's first industrial hemp manufacturing facility for clean, non-toxic, carbon-negative building materials.

So we're not just here with just an idea, but we're here with a project that kind of lives or dies based on Alaska having a workable hemp framework. So HB 325 does one critical thing. It finally treats industrial hemp as an agricultural crop and manufacturing feedstock instead of a legal gray area. The bill, of course, creates the tiered grow categories, the modernized testing, and it uses corrective action plans instead of immediate death penalties and streamlines in-state transport between registered parties.

And those are exactly the practical fixes that farmers and manufacturers need before they will invest acreage, equipment, and payroll here in Alaska. But nationally, this is no longer theoretically. Uh, the National Hemp Association estimates a typical hemp fiber and grain processing facility supports about 117 jobs, roughly $6.1 million in annual payroll, and over $30 million in total economic output. At the same time, universities and industry research show that hemp-based materials like hempcrete and hemp insulation can be carbon negative, locking away more CO2 than they emit, and also replacing toxic, high-emission building products. That combination—jobs and cleaner building materials—is exactly where Alaska should be competing.

So Greenbuilds Composites is designed to bring that value home. Our plan is to purchase Alaskan-grown— there's our Alaska railroad— our plan is to purchase Alaskan-grown industrial hemp, decorticated in Houston, and turn it into non-toxic, carbon-negative insulation and composite products for Alaska housing and construction. And that means real contracts for farmers, real manufacturing jobs in the valley, and fewer truckloads of expensive building materials imported from outside. H.B. 325 Does not ask you for money.

It asks you to give us regulatory clarity so these private sector investments can be possible. You may have also heard concerns about diversion and intoxicating hemp products, and Sacred Seed shares those concerns. We do not want a backdoor into the marijuana market. The answer, though, is not to crush industrial hemp as a whole. The answer is to draw clean and clear lines.

So I would suggest allowing DNR the chance to open this regulatory project and create regulations around a fit-for-purpose model, allowing strict public safety measures for non-consumable hemp products sold in the state and in alignment with the upcoming Farm Bill at the federal level. So with that intention, HB 325 can support agriculture and manufacturing while keeping intoxicants heating products under conscious control for public safety. So the choice in front of you is clear today. Either Alaska has a clear modern path for industrial hemp and projects like Green Built Composites, or we keep sending those jobs, those materials, and that innovation to other states. On behalf of Sacred Seeds Foundation, the farmers we work with, and the Alaskans who want clean, affordable building materials made here, I respectfully urge you to move HB 325 out of the House Judiciary and onto the House floor.

So thank you. I'm happy to answer any questions. I kind of deem myself as a hemp expert in the state of Alaska, so should you have questions about the regulations, I'm here for you. Uh, and thank you for your time. Thank you, Ms. Williams.

We will now go to Amy Seitz, Policy Director for the Alaska Farm Bureau. Ms. Seitz, if you'll please take yourself off of mute, place yourself on the record, and begin your testimony.

Yeah, good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. For the record, my name is Amy Seitz. I'm the policy director for Alaska Farm Bureau, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and give Alaska Farm Bureau's voice on House Bill 325. This bill provides a more streamlined and less burdensome future for the industrial hemp in Alaska.

Agricultural sector is an industry with opportunities. Opportunity to help diversify our economy, contribute to local communities, and expand favorable jobs. Industrial hemp is an area we should not overlook and should support the ability to grow.

With the lack of robust infrastructure and minimal funding for programs and services that support expansion in agriculture, it is vital that our laws help rather than hinder our producers.

Hemp is a legitimate agricultural commodity that deserves a regulatory environment that reflects this. House Bill 325 keeps Alaska in line with federal standards while relieving unnecessary and duplicative burdens on producers.

And I apologize for my dry throat.

So House Bill 325 keeps Alaska in line with federal standards while relieving unnecessary and duplicative burdens on our producers, creating an environment that is more supportive to expansion in this sector. It is important to make sure our industrial hemp growers are compliant, but we shouldn't be heavy-handed. To assist in having successful operations, it's important to have measures in place that focus on remediation and corrective actions instead of automatic punitive actions.

And allowing for a tiered approach to delineate between risk level and size of operation.

To ensure this industry can grow and to start seeing that the opportunity and potential this product has, we support shifting the regulatory mindset further away from drug enforcement to one of agricultural development. This includes things like adjusting how crops are dealt with that test between 0.3 and 1%. To provide farmers a safety margin. Currently, the hot crop can be a financial death sentence for a farm, and as we're trying to expand, you know, we have a lot of new and beginning farmers. If we make it that difficult to even get started, we just, we won't, we won't even see it start.

So allowing the ability to recondition or find an industrial, non-consumable use such as the fiber or animal bedding rather than the mandatory destruction will still give the farmer an option other than complete loss. By adopting standards like we find in House Bill 325 that treat hemp like agricultural commodities, we can foster economic development while ensuring consumer safety.

And we appreciate the introduction of House Bill 325. And really appreciate the committee taking the time to hear it today. So we hope our hemp laws improve through legislation like this, and I appreciate your time today. Thank you, Ms. Seitz. Um, for the committee's reference, we have Brian Scoresby, Director of the Division of Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources, online, available to answer questions as well.

Do we have any questions from committee for our invited testimony for Director Scoresby or for the sponsor?

Seeing none at this time, we will open public testimony. Public testimony on House Bill 352— is 325— is now open. Is there anyone in the room who would like to testify? Seeing no one in the room, we'll go online.

Seeing no one online, public testimony on House Bill 325 is now closed.

Are there any additional questions or comments from committee members?

At ease. I just want to— back on the record. Do we have a motion? Mr. Chair, I move to report House Bill 325, Work Order 34-LS1302/i, out of the House Judiciary Committee with individual recommendations and and attached fiscal note.

Hearing no objection, House Bill 325, Work Order 34-LS1302/i, as in India, is reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with individual recommendations and attached fiscal notes. Eddie, we'll go Eddie East to sign the paperwork.

Back on the record.

We will now take up consideration of the Governor's appointee to the Alaska Judicial Council, Mike Miller. Mr. Miller is joining us by phone.

Mr. Miller, would you please take yourself off mute, place yourself on the record, and make any opening remarks that you would like to share with the committee?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Mike Miller, and I'm calling from Fairbanks at the present time. And, uh, my opening statement is very brief, and then I'll open myself up for questions, and I'll answer to the best of my ability. But I'm looking forward to serving on the Judicial Council. I have a record of public service to the state of Alaska, and this is an area that I've served a number of years over in my time in the legislature on the Judiciary Committee, both in the House and Senate.

And I believe that Alaska has a very strong judiciary, and I'd like to see it stay that way by sending the most qualified candidates to the governor for selection. For the different judgeships that they open up or any new judgeships that may be created within the State of Alaska. And I think public service is an area that I can contribute to the state because the state has given me and my family so much that this is just a small measure that I can help pay back to the state that has given me so much. So, like I say, it's a very brief opening, but I'm certainly willing to take any questions that anybody may have. Thank you.

Thank you so much, Mr. Miller. What questions do we have from the committee?

Representative Eischeid. Thank you, Chair Gray. Uh, through the chair, thank you, Mr. Miller, for being here. Just in your opening statement, sir, you said Alaska has a strong judiciary. Can you, uh, flesh that out for me?

What do you mean by strong judiciary? And then relate it, um, what actions will you take on the council to maintain or strengthen that strong judiciary? Well, I think Alaska, I think the founders of the Constitution were very wise in the way that they set up the Judicial Council. And I know after I had left the legislature in 2000, there were a number of efforts to change the makeup of the Judicial Council. I was not there at the time that those measures were introduced.

Probably would not have supported them because I think the makeup of 3 attorneys, and 3 lay members from across the state, and of course, the Chief Justice to vote in any ties, I think is a strong makeup of the council. And I think that the council over the years have sent very qualified people to the governor, whoever that governor was or will be in the future, to make his or her selections for those positions. And I'm a very strong believer in the rule of law, having spent so much time in Juneau creating laws.

And I guess I'm saying that even though we may have— as we all come as individuals, come with different viewpoints, I think it's very incumbent that we also nominate people that we'll send to the bench that will.

Rule on the law as it is written. And that's why I think how we can make the bench much stronger. And I think we've had a very strong bench over the years. Yes, every once in a while, you know, the council would recommend a non-retention, but that is very far and few in between in the state of Alaska since we have become a state. So I guess that's the answer to your question.

Thank you. Any other questions from committee? Seeing none, we'll move to public testimony. Opening public testimony on, uh, Mike Miller. Uh, public testimony is now open.

Is there anyone in the room who would like to testify? Seeing no one in the room, we'll move online. Seeing no one online, we will close public testimony on Mike Miller. Public testimony is now closed.

Any final questions or comments from committee?

Uh, Mr. Miller, thank you so much for your many years of service to the state and to your region, and we are grateful for your willingness to serve. Thanks for being here today.

In accordance with AS 39.05.080, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the appointment of Mike Miller to the Alaska Judicial Council. We will now take a brief at ease to sign the committee report. A signature on this report does not reflect an intent by any of the members to vote for or against the confirmation of the individual during any further sessions. At ease.

Back on the record. Our final item of business today is House Bill 222, Workplace Violence Protective Orders, sponsored by Representative Hall. My office circulated a committee substitute earlier today. It is my intent to adopt the committee substitute as our working document. Do I have a motion?

I move Judiciary Committee Substitute for House Bill 222, work order number 34-LS0864/h, be adopted as the committee's working document. I will object for purposes of Thank you. Um, I'm going to ask my committee aide, Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, to come forward and give an explanation of the changes in the committee substitute. I would also note that we have Christine Pate from the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault in the room and available for questions. Thank you for being here.

Uh, good afternoon. Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, committee aide. Um, so as the committee may recall from the introduction of the bill, there was an extensive line of questioning regarding the proper scope of the workplace violence protective orders in terms of, is this— is, you know, where, where is the need that this is being felt in the community? Um, is it, you know, do all workplaces necessarily need this, this kind of protective order? And I think what was, uh, came out during the testimony there is that the most acute need for this is being seen in the space of domestic violence and sexual assault shelters, places where because of the nature of the work there are often people who are unhappy with the role that shelter is playing, who may be making threats.

There's also the situation where perhaps the shelter is serving somebody who, who could go get a protective order on behalf of themselves, but for very complicated and very fair reasons might not feel that they are in a great place to do that or might not want to poke the bear, so to speak, and so don't avail themselves of that opportunity. And so it would be very helpful for those entities, those shelters, to be able to actually obtain those protective orders because they are, they are at risk due to the work that they're doing. So the, at a high level, the main change that the Committee Substitute makes is to maintain the structure of the bill as it was drafted and to just narrow the scope of the kind of workplace to specifically be shelters that, that serve victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. The way that that was done functionally, the committee may also remember that we recently had another bill through that related to the definition of victim counseling centers. For purposes of confidentiality, we already have that framework and statute, so the way that the committee substitute is drafted is to use the definition of victim counseling center already established in the law, and to just say that those entities, that those workplaces that meet the definition of a victim counseling center can go through the process articulated by the bill and obtain the workplace violence protective orders.

The mechanics are unchanged from the previous version of the bill. The other addition, which is new, and you'll see this in sections 7 and in sections 10, relating to stalking and sexual assault protective orders and domestic violence protective orders respectively, this was in response to a separate hearing that this committee had. We heard from a constituent from Kodiak who spoke about, I think, at length and in a very compelling way about the difficulties for people who have to go renew their protective orders every year. And because currently the longest-term protective order that you can get in the state of Alaska is a 1-year protective order, so for people who, you know, where this is an ongoing situation, they are having to go back year after year to renew those. I believe that there was some questioning during that hearing too about, you know, how best to balance the interests of the petitioner and also the respondent and also to, you know, make sure that it's being used in appropriate cases.

So the approach that the committee substitute takes is that you have to already have a 1-year protective order issued in order to be eligible for this longer-term protective order. So you'd go in, you'd get the 1-year long-term protective order. When you go back to renew that, The judge now has discretion under this committee substitute to impose a protective order for a term of between 1 and 5 years, leaving that to the discretion of the judge based on the facts of the case. The burdens of proof and the other standards and all the notice requirements remain the same as under existing law. It just gives— it authorizes a judge to extend that protective order for up for— for between 1 and 5 years as appropriate.

I could go section by section, but those, those are the two main changes. Everything else is essentially conforming changes to reflect the updated terminology. Questions from committee? Representative Vance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for narrowing this down and really making it easy for the definition of victim counseling services.

I have a question about the discretion of a judge moving from 1 year to 1 to 5 years. Um, we had talked about how there are other states across the nation who currently do this. Um, do we know how often is that, that larger scale used, the, the higher number of years? Uh, is it, is it very common? Uh, it, you know, what are we looking at here?

And do you know what the circumstances usually are for someone to— for a judge to extend more than a year. And yes, please, I know it's a random question I didn't prep you for. Through the chair to Representative Vance, and if, if, uh, Ms. Pate has anything to add, I'd invite her up here at this.

Time, but to, to answer directly, Representative Betz, I, I don't know the, the details of that. Um, I will say in reviewing many of the different statutes in different states, um, we saw, uh, that there's a variety of different approaches. You know, some places that have an indefinite— the ability to do an indefinite protective order, other places that take a more discrete approach. It's a 2-year extension or it's a 5-year extension. And the thinking behind the committee substitute here is that rather than take the one-size-fits-all approach and say, you know, it must be a 2-year extension, or it must be a 5-year extension, we wanted to be able to authorize a court to provide the length that seemed appropriate under the facts of the case at hand, and without being overly prescriptive in the exact amount of time.

And so there are, you know, there are other states that do take that approach. There are other states that take a more granular approach. I would defer now to Mr. Katsas. Ms. Pate, if you'll put yourself on the record and address the question from Representative Vance.

Yes, Christine Pate, Legal Program Director for the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the committee substitute. Through the chair, Representative Vance, I think I echo mostly what Mr. Hitchcock— Lopez Hitchcock, I'm sorry.

Hitchcock Lopez, said there's a real variety. I—. When I— before I spoke last time, which was March 9th, I did a review of various statutes around the country. We were definitely in the lower group in terms of time. Some allowed up to 5 years, some allowed longer, some allow permanent protective orders.

This really puts it in the court's discretion, and as Mr. Hitchcock Lopez said, one needs to go back. So, Ms. Butch had testified that she had to go back year after year after year. This would only require her to go potentially back once, and she'd have to prove to the court that it was necessary to protect her from future domestic violence. And she— I'm assuming the court would look at the context at that point: how bad the domestic violence had originally been, how credible was her continuing fear, what else is going on with this you know, with the respondent and the petitioner. Is there a divorce or something else going on that will up the lethality of the situation?

So we have not put any prescription on what that should be, but we've put it in the court's discretion, I believe, in this bill, or Chair Gray has. Great, thank you. I do have a follow-up question for Ms. Mead, if she's available.

Sure.

Thank you, Miss Mead, for being available. Uh, we— I have questions around due process. We've received a lot of advocacy against this bill, and maybe not this specific committee substitute, but the concerns around due process and Second Amendment rights. And people having their firearms, you know, confiscated by the courts. Can you tell us what the current practice is?

The Supreme Court— I know that I've seen that Supreme Court has made decisions around domestic violence protective orders with the Second Amendment. Are you familiar with that? Through the chair to Representative Vance, Just a little bit. I mean, I do know that with a protective order, the court can order that a person not have guns. Most of this is— well, first of all, for the Department of Public Safety, the court doesn't take guns.

And there are federal laws that come out of the Violence Against Women Act that have to do with a respondent's ability to have firearms during the pendency of a protective order, which they can't, and afterwards. But I'm afraid I'm not an expert on that VAWA law. That's the Violence Against Women Act. A follow-up? Can you tell us what the conditions are that have to be met under these domestic violence protective orders?

For someone to have their firearm seized, or at least temporarily? Through the chair to Representative Vance, a long-term protective order can say the person can't bring firearms around a person if a firearm was used in the context of the crime of domestic violence that forms the basis for a domestic violence protective order. In other words, if If the threat or the crime of domestic violence was waving a gun or shooting a gun, then that, that's the link to being able to say in the protective order that you can't have the gun. If the violence is something different with a different weapon or hands or something, then that would not be justified in the order. Beyond that, I'm really not certain what the Violence Against Women Act provides in terms of long-term denial of a person's right to carry firearms.

Okay, Ms. Pate, are you able to comment? Um, yeah, through the chair, um, Representative Vance, I, I did not look specifically at the Violence Against Women Act, um, federal requirements, but I do believe that they require a relationship, a domestic violence relationship of some sort, whether it's spouse, partner, ex-partner. So the— this victim counseling center protective order would be outside of that. I think the United States Supreme Court case that you were talking about was Rahimi, which— in which the United States Supreme Court did find that in a domestic violence protective order context, it was constitutional to allow for the taking of firearms because, as Ms. Mee just said, in domestic violence protective orders when the parties have a relationship.

There was enough need— I'm not going to restate the reasoning of that case well, but there was enough need and history that they could find that there would be a reason to find that this did not violate the Second Amendment. So this Victim Counseling Center protective order is is different from a domestic violence protective order. And there's nothing in this law that says that there would be firearms taken. It's very specific in the domestic violence protective order under state law that if it's been used in the commission of the act of domestic violence, that you can take the firearm.

I think, from my perspective, we're engaging in good debate about the bill, I would like to adopt the committee substitute. Do you maintain your objection? I do. I have one more question. One more question about the committee substitute.

Representative Mena. Thank you, Chair Gray. Through the chair to Ms. Mead, could you just comment also on impact on the courts or any other feedback changing the discretion for the long-term protective orders to 1 to 5 years? Through the chair to Representative Mena, the court does not receive a lot of petitions, uh, for extensions of protective orders, uh, whether the court would order 1 year or 5 years or somewhere in that range would not have a workload impact on the court, and it would not materially affect our operations. That's a discretionary call that the judge could make without, um, you know, more training or anything like that.

So the court is completely neutral on those provisions. Thank you. Thank you. Um, Representative Mena. Um, we were joined by Representative Underwood at 2:29 PM.

I will respectfully remove my objections so we can continue asking questions. Thank you, Representative Vance. Seeing no further objections, we have adopted the committee substitute as our working document. We will now continue with questions about the bill before us, which is the Newly adopted committee substitute.

Representative Vance. Do we have Department of Law online? We do not have Department of Law online. Would you like us to take an ease and get Department of Law online? Well, maybe Dylan can answer the question.

Okay. So my question is regarding the last statement. I just want clarity. So, uh, we are adding a new section about Victim Counseling Center protective orders, and, um, I, I just want to be— have a full understanding about Second Amendment protections, um, with this because there's concern that there's a lack of due process. And so I just want to make sure that it's clear on the record the changes that we're making in law.

I think Ms. Mead would like to respond. Through the chair to Representative Vance, and building on the prior answer from Ms. Pate, the domestic violence protective order statute for the long-term order specifically says that the court can direct a respondent to surrender firearms if it was used during the commission of the domestic violence, as I mentioned. That is not included in this new sort of protective order.

That would be created for the victim counseling centers. So, on page 4, starting at line 15, this is what the court can order, and that is, you know, prohibit them from threatening, prohibit— but the last line is, "Order other relief the court determines to be necessary to protect the petitioner's victim counseling center." I just want to say, potentially, a court, a judge could say, "I think it's necessary that you know, hearkening back to other, you know, duties that you should surrender your firearm because you were waving around guns or shooting guns on the sidewalk, and that was the specific threat. So in here, that is potentially orderable by a court for this type of protective order. Again, the Violence Against Women Act is— it pertains to not just women, but victims of domestic violence. And, and those provisions, it seems to me, would not directly apply to this sort of protective order.

So I don't know if that was clarifying or not. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, it, it is clarifying. Uh, how I could see how someone would have a lot of consternation that their firearms are being taken away without, um, so in, in In the instance that someone was— have either had committed an act of violence, waving around their firearm, which is technically brandishing, are they typically charged with a crime at that point? Because I think the concern is that with a protective order, they haven't been officially charged with a crime and are not afforded the same due process.

So do charges crimes typically coincide with a protective order? Through the chair to Representative Vance, sadly not, not terribly often, or not as a typical matter. So because a civil protective order is just two citizens against each other, for lack of a better way to describe it, coming to the court, and, and of course further steps have to be made if law enforcement is involved, which of course they often are not with domestic violence, or if a report is then made to law enforcement or to the district attorney's office with the request that charges be brought. So there are, for example, many, many domestic violence protective order proceedings that do not result in any sort of criminal charges for the respondent. And let me just address your due process concern directly.

So, so with domestic violence protective orders, um, It is clear in the statutes that the first stage, ex parte, where only one party shows up, just the petitioner, and so the respondent has not had due process, has not had a good chance to explain themselves, the court cannot order firearms to be surrendered at that point. The statute makes that clear. It's only at the long term, after a hearing and after the respondent has received that due process of notice and an opportunity to be heard, may firearm surrenders be ordered by the court. So to the extent you're speaking of due process, the current statutes for domestic violence ensure in a statutory manner that there is some hearing before somebody's firearms are taken. Follow-up for clarification.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So yes, and that's a— I see that that's a federal requirement for notice of opportunity.

Do they— there's a difference between opportunity and them actually being present for that. Does the court recognize that, or is it that they are always present when— if they were going to have their restriction on their firearms? Through the chair to Representative Vance, for the ex parte, they are often not present. That's one person. But then there has to be at least 20 days generally, uh, the respondent who is accused of committing the threat, the domestic violence, absolutely gets served by law enforcement with the piece of paper that shows what they can or can't do for the next 20 days and the date and time of the hearing.

So they certainly have full actual notice. If they choose not to show up, it could still be they've had the opportunity to be heard, which is what due process requires, not necessarily that they decided to take up that opportunity. So it could be that they decide not to show up and the court does issue that long-term order if they have a preponderance of the evidence that it's happened. So that's how the due process would play into it. One more question.

Thank you. You had mentioned in the— thank you for the excellent answers, by the way— on the victim counseling, the new provision, you had mentioned that there is— it does say the court has it— can order other relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner. Will those same requirements be in place even though this— under this number 4, other relief, even though the statute doesn't specifically prescribe that for firearms? Page 4, line 27.

Through the chair to Representative Vance, I see now that potentially that could be strengthened because the provision that says any other relief that they determine necessary is for the long-term order. So when the person does have notice and an opportunity to be heard, if you flip the page to page 5, lines 15 and 16, now this is the ex parte stage. And only one party is there, so the respondent has not received notice and an opportunity to be heard typically. It does say that the court can grant any of those protections under 875. So it is— its potential— I will say courts are careful about firearms and recognizing the structure in the other statutes.

I don't know how real a threat that would be, but, but the, but your point is, is well taken. Thank you, Miss Mead. And Mr. Chairman, I just want to make it clear for everyone who is advocating for the victim counseling centers and all the victims, I want all of the protections for them, but make sure that we are balancing our constitutional protections here and that we get the law right. So thank you for letting me dialogue. Thank you.

I'll also just, uh, for our two legal minds in front of us, just make sure that I understand the line of questioning from Representative Vance. If, um, someone does not threaten their partner with firearms, does not say that they are going to hurt them or shoot them or kill them with firearms, if then, then it's unlikely that they would have their firearms taken away from them with a domestic violence protective order. Would that be a correct statement? Through the chair, I think that's a correct statement, especially because the statute says that that is something the court can do if firearms were used, with of course the negative implication that if not, that would be, uh, quite a radical thing to order. And then my second question would be for the Victim Counseling Center protective order.

We could tell people, like, don't wave guns in front of Victim Counseling Centers. Do not shoot at Victim Counseling Centers. If you don't shoot at Victim Counseling Centers, if you don't wave firearms in front of the Victim Counseling Center, if you're not threatening the Victim Counseling Center with your firearms, it would be unlikely that the court would rule that you must surrender your firearms. I would say that's a fair statement to the chair. Yeah, I would agree with that.

And let me, if I could just, um, clarify, um, Ms. Mead's comment. Under state law, um, that is what is required for, um, for the state who would be enforcing it to take firearms. Under federal law, It doesn't necessarily have to be used in commit— in the commission of domestic violence. If you have a qualifying protective order against you under federal law, you should not be owning a firearm. That is enforced by the federal enforcement agencies, or Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and it would— the way that that would, I guess, play out for someone is they would go to purchase a new firearm and and they would be in a registry of protective orders and they would get flagged.

Okay? So that's federal law. We don't have control— like, that's nothing in here will be— nothing in this Victim Counseling Center Act will affect that. That is just currently what's in federal law, which was found constitutional— well, actually, found constitutional in Rahimi. Thank you.

Other questions? Representative Costello. Thank you. Um, so my question has to do with—. So the bill is substantially different than as introduced, and I was wondering— I know the sponsor's here observing— I was wondering, and I don't need an answer, but could she update the sponsor statement so that on basis it reflects the new version?

Okay, thank you. Thank you, Representative.

Cassello, and I, I will admit that I've done lots of things out of order in the script today, and one of them was to have the sponsor come forward and offer her opinion on the CS before we adopted it. But I would now like to call the sponsor, um, Representative Hallford, and her staff, Keith Bruce, to comment on the CS that we've already adopted and any other comments that you have about the new version of the bill. And I do have some questions. Okay.

Good afternoon, uh, co-chair, uh, or excuse me, Chair Gray, um, and members of the House Judiciary Committee. For the record, my name is Carolyn Hall and I represent House District 16, which is the West Anchorage neighborhoods of Turnagain, Bernard, and Sand Lake. And with me here is my staff, Keith Bruce. By narrowing the eligible group to victim counseling centers, the CS more closely aligns the bill with its original intention, and it avoids the expansive policy considerations raised by a broader class of employers. So yes, the CS before the committee is friendly.

Thank you for the question. Thank you. Representative Costello. Thank you. And I think my question, um, is probably for somebody else.

Um, okay, it has to do with protective orders themselves. Um, then it'll probably be Ms. Pate. Okay, thank you.

Go ahead. Um, Miss Pate, so the protective orders, are they public documents? And would the address of the, um victim counseling center be listed in, in the protective order? Um, that's through the chair, Representative Costello. That's a great question.

Um, I, um, so they are public documents generally. Um, the only time that protective orders are taken off of what we call CourtView, which is the database of all the court filings, is when an ex parte order is not granted. Then it is not on court view. One could still go to the local clerk's office and get a copy of the file, unless it had been specifically made confidential through the— like, through rules, through what party had asked permission to say, "I want this to be a confidential filing." In a regular protective order, you can keep your address confidential if you choose to, and I don't know that there is a provision. I'd have to look again whether there's a provision in this protective order for that to happen.

Since the threat— well, since the violence has to have happened on the— near the center or been made to it, my guess is they would know where the victim counseling center is. And most of our victim counseling centers in the state, because we're a small state, people know where they are. So I'm not sure what it's— what, what this bill says, but I can look quickly. So is, um, is a victim counseling center also include domestic violence shelters or not?

Through the chair, Representative Costello, this, um, the definition of victim counseling center is the one that is found in the Victim Victim Advocate privilege, which includes a private organization or a local government that has as its main mission domestic violence and sexual assault work, basically. So then they are considered under this definition? Yes, correct. Okay, so the reason I'm asking is because in my time here I've heard about how important it is that these domestic violence, um, shelters are— well, some are actually set away from— I mean, I've been to some of them. They're, they're intentionally off the beaten track.

I know there's one in Anchorage that's literally in an industrial area. It's not even a neighborhood with homes, although this home is at the end of the street. I'm just curious about— I mean, obviously the person who is the recipient of the order knows where the location is. That's why they have the the restraining order. But in terms of just the general population, what will happen over time is that we will be populating our, um, you know, the court view with addresses of the shelters, um, and the, um, and the counseling centers so that these, you know, efforts to protect women and keep them safe and not necessarily be broadcasting Oftentimes they don't even have a sign outside.

So I'm just curious, have we contemplated that part of the bill that might make something that currently is more private and secure a little bit more open and transparent for others who might victimize people?

Through the chair, Representative Costello, and— and VSA has 24 member programs. I believe that most of our member programs have websites and have their addresses on that because we want people to be able to know where to find us if they need services. So I don't know that there's been thoughts about the, I guess, unintended consequences of that perhaps with this bill, but I would say that I think there is generally a lot of information out there already about ANSVA programs specifically that you know, and why we're bringing this concern forward. You're not worried about that? Not currently.

Okay. And I think I have some questions for Ms. Mead now. Ms. Mead.

Thank you, Ms. Mead. I have questions about page 4, lines 27 and 28. And the previous discussion revolved around another section of law that speaks to what the court can and can't do, and there's some sideboards on that. To me, this looks like there are no sideboards, and I was curious if you could comment on what those two lines mean and how much flexibility does the court have in, um, other relief.

Through the chair to Representative Costello, the court does have flexibility to order other relief. It can be a very wide range. It might be something like, well, in the domestic violence situation, things like, you know, to make some child custody payments or to do, you know, to make a new set of keys. It's just there for flexibility. So, you you know, to the, uh, the house, for example, or order the person to turn over, for example, the, uh, petitioner's documents that he or she might have been keeping from their partner.

It's, it's a broad-based ability of the court to shape the, the order for the specific circumstances of that domestic violence that has occurred in that case. Sure. So what you're talking about is I mean, you're basically saying that this term other relief exists elsewhere in statute and it's used by the court. So in this case, though, this is— this bill is specific to the shelters and the counseling centers. So what would you contemplate other relief might look like?

Because this isn't— it sounds like the court has that ability elsewhere, which You know, obviously, this term exists, but why would the court need other relief when it's dealing with a shelter or a counseling center? Through the chair to Representative Costello, the other place that this other relief the court deems necessary is in the other protective orders, and so it does exist elsewhere. Why in this instance? I guess I can imagine a situation where the court thinks not only is this respondent, uh, being threatening on the sidewalks outside the domestic violence shelter, but there's some threat that makes the judge believe that person might follow somebody home in their vehicle or might follow them to the, the car store afterwards. So in that final line in the, in the other orders, the judge may order respondent to, uh, you know, to stay away from every employee of this shelter during the full duration of this order or something along those lines.

I just came up— I mean, I just imagined that this moment, but the ability for the court to have flexibility is often very important for the safety of petitioners in protective order proceedings. So yeah, it was clear to me when you answered before that other relief exists elsewhere in the statute, so I understand that. Um, so now you're saying that under this statute, if a court wanted to reach outside of this and amend the other domestic violence restraining order, they could do that because of this statute, or would this be literally focused on the counseling center and the shelter? Through the chair to Rep. Costello, it would.

This is a whole separate proceeding. Complete—. There can be— there might be zero other protective orders in place for anybody involved in this situation. I mean, people might be at the, uh, the, uh, the shelter who don't have a protective order yet or, or may not ever have one. They're there for other reasons.

So this specific proceeding where somebody, the employer, the manager, or something goes in and says, "You're threatening my employee's parking lot," the court can order the relief deemed necessary to stop that threat, um, in order to protect the center. And so, so they might have to reach farther beyond the sidewalks of the center, and that's what gives them the flexibility to do so. I, I can't really come up with anything that's, um, that might come into play there. Maybe Ms. Pate can, but But that flexibility is— I mean, it's often exercised in the other areas where it is also permitted for domestic violence protective orders.

So I can imagine that that would be useful in some situations. Ms. Pate. Yes, through the chair, Representative Castello. Another thing I guess I might think is if, let's say, the respondent in this victim counseling center protective order had damaged something at the center, they they could be ordered in that catch-all to pay the costs of repairing it.

That paying costs and fees is something that is specifically allowed for in the domestic violence protective orders. It's not specifically allowed for in here, but the court in its discretion, looking at the specifics of this case, could say, "Okay, that seems fair to me that that would be necessary to protect this employment center, this victim counseling center, and make it so that this respondent never does this again. So, so do we have laws on the books right now? Because it's my understanding that this bill is because of one situation in a rural community where there was a person who was basically loitering or trespassing. Do— Miss Meade, do we have trespassing and loitering laws right now that would give the counseling centers and domestic violence shelters some kind of legal relief?

I mean, what would— what is a trespassing violation encompass? Would it be similar to this? Through the chair to Representative Costello, a trespass would, would mean if somebody comes onto your property and you could call the law enforcement and have them removed from your property. What I heard from the sponsor of the bill is that sometimes these threatening situations occur and the person, the threat-er, is not on the property and therefore the trespass law wouldn't allow law enforcement to remove them, for example, from a public sidewalk or from a public parking lot or street, so that it's threatening to the, to the victim counseling center, but it is not on their property, so they could not trespass the person. That's my understanding from the sponsor.

All right. Thank you. Thank you. Any other questions?

May I— can I respond to this? Yes, Ms. Pate. I would just say, um, through the chair, to Representative Costello, it's my understanding from our member programs that there's at least 3 or 4 member programs that have experienced situations where they have been concerned about violence perpetrated at the shelter or that could be a threat of violence, and that has included Anchorage, Emonak, Bethel, um, and up in Ukiadik. Thank you.

Representative Eischeid. Yeah, thank you, Chair Gray. Mostly a comment. I, I had a chance to tour a victim counseling center in Anchorage during interim, and staff told me then about perpetrators that would be on the public sidewalk visible from the entrance, uh, and, um, trying to, uh, spread fear, I guess. And I just, you know, as a former public— well, currently public employee as well, but, um, I've had my own threats, and it's hard to focus on your work when, when people are not trespassing, but they're, they're trying to intimidate and instill fear.

And I just, um I appreciate this because I, I don't think employees should work in a situation where they're, they're experiencing fear because of a potentially dangerous, violent person. Thank you.

Thank you, Representative Eichheidt. So it is 2:55 PM and we have to be back on the floor, I believe, in 5 minutes. 4:30. What, 4:30? We've got 90 minutes.

We'll continue with questions. Yes, at ease.

Representative Costello. Thank you. So, um, so this is creating a new section of law that's absolutely separate from a domestic violence order. And so we already know because of experience, unfortunately, what federal and state laws surround what happens when there's a domestic violence order. What we don't know is what state and federal laws are going to apply to this new category, because it's not, it's not as personal.

I mean, you have a center. I imagine that the executive director of the counseling center, the domestic violence shelter, will be the one you know, putting this or asking for relief from the court. So it's, it's less personal, and it, it seems to be that it might behoove us as the Judiciary Committee to get some clarification on, does or do the federal and state laws that exist for the domestic violence orders also extend to this new type of, um, of order that we're creating in this bill. Thank you. Can either Ms. Mead or Ms.

Pate or both respond to that inquiry? Um, through the chair, Representative Costello, um, so it is only the domestic violence protective order that requires a household relationship. So dating relationship, spouse, live-together household relationship, where you can take a firearm if it's used in the commission of the domestic violence. And then the court at the long-term hearing, after due process, has the ability to, as one of the remedies, ask the respondent to surrender their firearm. That's under state law.

That is not in the this new violence victim counseling center protective order.

Under the Violence Against Women Act, there has to be a qualifying domestic violence— qualifying domestic violence protective order in place in order for, under federal law, someone to take your firearms. And that would include a certain household relationship also, which is defined in federal law. I don't have the exact parameters of that, but it's similar, where it's a boyfriend or girlfriend, a spouse, and there has to be a certain type of violence that occurs, a credible threat or an assault of some type. I'm paraphrasing. And it has to be after notice and an opportunity to be heard, which is what we've talked about with due process.

So, you can't take it in at the 20-day, at the ex parte level has to be after someone has had a chance.

To come and say their piece, and that is only under federal law, and that is not— would not apply to the Victim Counseling Center protective order. Does that answer your question? So in this situation, if this bill were to pass, a person could have their firearms taken from them because you're saying the federal— the laws do not apply that apply in a domestic violence situation. Those laws do not apply here, and so when the court can order other relief, it has any relief that it could come up with, including taking of the firearm. So through the chair, Representative Costello, I think what Ms. Mead was saying about that catch-all section is it's conceivable, it's conceivable that a judge could say, I am going to require also, Respondent, that your firearms be taken, but it would— I mean, judges' jobs are to honor the Constitution, the federal and the state Constitution.

One would hope they would not be doing anything that would be unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

It would seem very unlikely, unless somebody was brandishing a gun at a domestic violence or sexual assault program or threatening somebody with a gun, that that would happen, and it is not not specifically in the remedies, so they would have to use a catch-all to do that, and they would have to do it after notice and opportunity to be heard and at the long-term hearing. Does that answer your question?

Thank you. Thank you. I'll just state from my understanding again that if someone is not brandishing a weapon, such as a firearm, towards a victim counseling center, and they're not shooting at the Victim Counseling Center, for example, then it would be unlikely— if their threatening behavior had nothing to do with their firearms, it would be very unlikely that the other relief would involve their firearms. Would that be a fair statement? That's a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Any other questions? Representative Mina. Thank you, Chair Gurry. Through the chair to Ms. Mead, I just want to clarify on page 4, lines 22 to 23, this phrase, um, uh, during the normal course of the petitioner's business.

So if it's the employer that's applying for the protective order and it's granted, That would apply to all business hours of the shelter, is that correct? Through the chair to Representative Mena, at least I think the normal course of a business that is geared towards victims of domestic violence is likely a 24-hour facility. And just to follow up, and through the chair, and this might be for Ms. Pate, I just want to ensure that this would also help guarantee that volunteers at these housing centers or shelters would be protected as well. Um, through the chair, Representative Mena, I think to the extent that violent people are not allowed at the places where we go for sanctuary, for protection, including domestic violence and sexual assault protective orders, that is absolutely correct.

This gives, this gives an employer the opportunity to protect their employees, their volunteers, and their residents. Follow-up through the chair, uh, to maybe Miss Pate. If it's not a 24-hour shelter and it is a counseling center that does have specific office hours, would this language restrict the ability for the court to limit that protective order since the language is specific to the normal course of the petitioner's business, like those normal hours. I'm trying to just understand what that normal course means and just making sure that this CES would prevent someone from being on premises outside of their open hours.

Through the chair, Representative Mena.

I believe— I mean, I don't think that it would have any restriction. I think they would both be equally protected. I don't think this says that somebody who is only operating 12 hours a day versus 24 hours a day would be less restricted. So I think that that is— that just allows the court to extend the stay-away order to places outside of, of where the actual victim counseling center is. Thank you.

Other questions or comments?

I do. Representative Vance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for Ms. Mead. So we are a constitutional carry state.

And so people carry, openly carry firearms for a variety of reasons. Um, you know, we have bears and coyotes around, and, um, I think the concern is that this new statute isn't as clear as some of our other protective order statutes that have clear due process when it comes to our firearms. Um, what kind of— I feel like there's a kind of a choke point here since not every state is constitutional carry like we are. So can you give us some reference for other states that have similar either workplace or workplace protective orders that are also constitutional carry? I know I'm asking a very specific question, but I'm trying to kind of understand what other states are doing that are similarly situated.

Through the chair to Representative Vance, I'm afraid maybe Ledge Legal would give you a better answer. I can't shoot from the hip and attempt to answer that one. I'm sorry.

Touché. No, I didn't mean it. Ms. Pate, are you able to comment? Uh, I am not.

Thank you.

I mean, I would, I guess, through the chair to Representative Vance, I think what is in this bill in terms of the catch-all is exactly what's in the sexual assault and stalking protective orders, which also allow for this catch-all and would meet all of what you have talked about also. I mean, and I've been doing this work for a very long time. I have never heard of a judge taking a firearm in the catch-all provisions of the blocking or sexual assault protective orders, um, because I think there might be Second Amendment concerns about that. So thank you. At ease.

Back on the record. Um.

I'll just make a couple of comments that, uh, when we had, uh, Ms. Butch here and we heard her testimony, I felt very strongly that we needed to address this issue of having our domestic violence, uh, victims have to come forward every year and relive their trauma. So it's really important that we're adding this 1 to 5 year discretion from the judge. So that victims of domestic violence don't have to go through that. And, um, I am— that for me, no offense to the bill sponsor, is the part that I care the most about. Um, I do understand and I can see these, uh, occasional issues where there might be the need for this, uh, victim counseling center protective order, but.

My feeling is that this is not going to be a common protective order that will be sought. And I guess maybe we can call the sponsor for it and her staff if she would like to comment a little about— or Ms. Mead, did you want to make a comment? To the chair, I would say with this change to— in the CS, narrowing it from employer to one particular type of employer, one particular place, that certainly there will— the court does not expect the influx that might have happened if they were workplace violence protective orders. As the committee recalls from the last meeting with some scenarios about grocery stores and schools and every facility where there's an employer, which is everywhere, this is obviously a much narrower place with— we would expect far fewer protective order proceedings under this provision.

Representative Costello.

Um, could you comment on what if we were to just delete lines 27 and 28 on page 4? Would that cause a big problem? Uh, through the chair to Representative Costello, that would be a policy call that you can make. Um, it, it would remove some discretion from the judge. Uh, if the goal is to remove discretion because of a fear that the judge will over-exercise it in terms of firearms, I can see that the committee may want to do that.

I would agree with Ms. Pate that it would be extremely rare, and with the chair, by the way, extremely rare for a judge to order anything to do with firearms, certainly if no firearms were involved. If you take that away, you do take some of the flexibility, for example, pay some restitution, which can be very valuable in situations. So that, you know, the bill would be workable without it, but there are definitely some pluses and minuses of taking away the discretion to craft an order for particular circumstances that could arise.

I'll comment on that. I just thought that the example that Ms. Mead gave of someone who was perhaps following employees home remaining on public property but following them home. I could see that happening. I could see that employees being very uncomfortable with that behavior. And so I think allowing some latitude for a judge to make specific orders to prevent behavior like that, for example, which I believe Ms. Mead said preventing the person from having— being at a certain amount of space between them and any of the employees.

I think that would be something that I would want the judge to have the latitude to do. So I would feel uncomfortable about taking lines 27 and 28 out, because I could see that it could be very valuable in certain situations that maybe we're not even thinking about right now.

Sure. Yeah, of course. I mean, everything we do, there's always a balance. There are— I read in the packet, or that there are other states that have done similar, have similar bills. This was to the original version.

Do we know if other states have that other relief language in their statutes? Through the chair, Director Costello, I'm not familiar with what the other states do. I'm sorry. Ms. Peay, are you? No, you're— no, we represent— thank you, Chair Greggs.

Okay, at ease.

Back on the record. So, um, for, uh, folks at home, we're having a conversation about, um, the chances of someone being falsely accused and having a victim counseling protective order— victim counseling center protective order placed against them. And so to Ms. Pate and Ms. Mead, it's my understanding that in order to have a victim counseling protective order placed against you, that there should be some evidence that you have indeed showed up at a victim counseling center and threatened the victim counseling center in some way. Would that be accurate?

Yes, Chair Gray, they would have to show— they would have to prove to a court for the ex parte probable cause that there had been— they had— there was a committed act of violence against the employer or employee that occurred at the employer's victim counseling center, or that the respondent, the person against whom the protective order was being sought, made a threat of violence against the employer or the employee that could be reasonably construed to happen at the victim counseling counseling center. So the probable cause for the ex parte, only a 20-day order, preponderance of the evidence, the judge would have to find more likely than not that that was— that that had been found by petitioner's statements to the court, other evidence, other witnesses. It's a mini-hearing that would happen. Thank you. And my follow-up for that would be, when you've presented before to this committee on the different types of protective orders, part of your interpretation was that many petitions for protective orders are denied.

And so the bottom line is someone could.

Petition for a Victim Counseling Center protective order, but if they don't meet the criteria, they haven't shown that this person has indeed been a threat or behave in a violent manner, it would be denied. Like, like, just because somebody is petitioning for a protective order doesn't mean it's going to be granted. Can you just speak briefly about that? Yes, Chair Gray, thank you. Absolutely.

It's It's a court hearing. The petitioner has a chance to put on their evidence. The respondent, the person accused, would have a chance to put on their evidence about why they didn't think they did this. And then the court would make a decision. And again, they'd have to show by a preponderance of the evidence, the petitioner would have to have proven that it was more likely than not that this person had committed that act of violence.

So if someone had never visited a victim counseling center or the sidewalk out in front of it, It would be impossible for that person to have a Victim Counseling Center protective order issued against them. I mean, you, you, you would have had to have threatened this Victim Counseling Center in some way, or no? I mean, I guess just to explain what— how does that— the examples we've given have been about people on, on sidewalks, but I mean, could somebody do it by email and get this? I guess, can you speak a little bit about that? Yeah, um, yes, thank you, Representative Chair.

They could. They can make a threat of violence but it has to be about a threat that could be carried out at the victim counseling center. So, it'd be like, you know, I'll take myself as the— let's say I'm the executive director of the, you know, X, Y, and Z Counseling Center. Ms.— I get an email, Ms. Pate, I hate what you do and I am going to blow up your building, or, you better watch your back because I'm watching you, you know, something that made me feel like there was going to be an act of violence that was going to be committed against me at my victim counseling center.

Thank you. And so then that email would be the evidence? That would be part of the evidence. There may be other things, but that would be a critical piece of evidence, certainly.

Any other questions?

At ease.

The record and my committee aide, Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, is going to attempt to answer the question about what other states have done in terms of the catch-all provision on page 4, lines 27 and 28, that we've been asking questions about. Mr. Hitchcock Lopez. For the record, Dylan Hitchcock Lopez, committee aide. Yeah, so there was a little speed research there, but I was able to definitively review several laws, and I can tell you that Arizona, Arkansas, and Nevada, of the statutes that I reviewed— I'm assuming there are more, because I was only able to get about halfway through the list of states— but those three states have almost identical language in their statutes, a catch-all provision that provides that a judge can provide any other relief sort of deemed necessary. The language in all three of those is almost identical.

Thank you, Mr. Hitchcock Lopez.

Any other questions or comments at this time?

Can I have a motion? Oh, well, sorry, pause please. Would the sponsor or their staff like to make any closing comments?

Thank you. Okay, um, can I have a motion?

Mr. Chair, I move that Judiciary Committee substitute for HASPO 222 work order number 34-LS0864 4/h be reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with additional individual recommendations and attached fiscal notes. Object. Thank you. Would you like to speak to your objection?

I would. I'd like to say that I do support this bill, but because we've identified a possible area that may need a little bit— some additional language to clarify in statute about the firearm— the Second Amendment and due process protections in this new area of statute. I'm going to object so that it can be handled in the next committee, but I think we've identified the reasons that this draft came forward, but want to make sure that we are very, very clear in this new area of law that it's protecting every citizen. But it is in no way to protect, uh, people who have clearly committed domestic violence. I believe that they should be fully prosecuted, but in in wanting to add trust in our laws, I think there's additional language that needs to be added for clarification.

Thank you, Representative Vance. Um, would the clerk please call the roll?

Representative Costello. No. Representative Underwood is not present. Representative Kopp is not present. Representative Aishad.

Yes. Representative Mena. Yes. Representative Vance. No.

Chair Gray. Yes. 3 Yeas, 2 nays. With a vote of 3 yeas and 2 nays, um, Judiciary Committee substitute for HB 222, work order number 34-LS0864/h, as in hotel, is reported out of the House Judiciary Committee with the individual recommendations and attached fiscal notes. I give authority to Ledge Legal to make any conforming changes.

We will sign the paperwork after we gavel out. That concludes today's business before the committee. As a reminder, on Friday we will hear HB 159, Property Possession and Property Crimes. Sorry, as a reminder, HB 159, Property Possession and Property Crimes, has been removed from Friday's calendar at the request of the sponsor. My office will be in touch if we have anything scheduled for Friday.

The time is now 3:27 PM, and this hearing of the House Judiciary Committee is adjourned.